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Abstract 
 
The paper aim is to analyse the influence of the European Employment Strategy (EES) 
in the implementation of the Spanish labour market policies. The first part of the paper 
describes the evolution and content of the EES. In the second one, the definition of 
activation is also explained. In addition to that, the ways how the EES develops and 
promotes active labour market policies are examined.  
 
The evolution of labour market policies in Spain and the current configuration of both 
active and passive policies are studied in the next three chapters. In these parts, the paper 
investigates to which extent the provisions of the EES have been implemented in Spain.  
 
 The paper shows that: i) activation has been rising in the European countries 
since the implementation of the EES; ii) this fact has also happened in relative terms 
(comparing the evolution of active to passive policies); iii) Spain has been one of the 
countries which has led these processes; iv) the EES seems to have been influencing the 
configuration of some parts of the Spanish labour market policies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Ever since the two oil crises, unemployment has consolidated itself as one of the most 
important problems in capitalist countries. Unemployment rates have shifted from a 
situation of full employment to 8.6% for the Eurozone in the third quarter of 2004. The 
EU has recently introduced the fight against unemployment as one of its most important 
concerns. 
Since 1997 the European Employment Strategy (EES) has transformed 
employment policies into a European issue through the Open Method of Coordination. 
The 2000 Lisbon summit set as an important objective making the European Union the 
most competitive and dynamic economy of the world as a way to regain full 
employment conditions. Unfortunately, employment policies implemented so far, based 
on a supply-side orientation, have not been appropriately coordinated with 
macroeconomic policies. 
European welfare states have been put under pressure since the oil crises. Several 
factors have influenced and constrained them. While there does not seem to be any 
convergence between the four models of European welfare states (Nordic, Continental, 
Anglo-Saxon and Southern), two measures have been commonly implemented: budget 
control and activation. The latter is a word used to describe different policies with 
separate aims, but with a very important common component: work is increasingly 
considered to be a moral duty.  
The Spanish labour market has registered several important changes since the end 
of Franco’s dictatorship. Reforms in the labour market have been oriented mainly 
towards an increase in flexibility. Activation is the most recent instrument to be 
introduced into the Spanish labour market, whereas passive policies have been 
progressively reduced.       
This paper is a first step in the process of comparing how activation has been 
understood and implemented in the four European welfare state models. To do so, Spain 
will be taken as a starting point. The paper follows in section two with the history, 
functioning and the economic logic of the EES, looking carefully to its problematical 
relationship with macroeconomic policies and its influence on different welfare state 
models. The third section studies the definition of the concept of activation, the pros and 
cons of active labour market policies, and the analysis of its relationship with concepts 
like workfare and to make work pay. It also examines the activation content of the EES. 
In the fourth part, the evolution of the Spanish labour market policies implemented 
since 1976 will be described, paying special attention to the most recent reforms. It will 
describe the current employment strategy too. In the fifth section, activation policies in 
Spain will be classified and explained, connecting them to the EES both in quantitative 
and qualitative terms. Section six studies the importance and chief characteristics of 
Spanish passive policies. It compares the importance of active and passive policies too. 
The last part of the paper is devoted to present the most important conclusions of the 
work. 
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2. Functioning of the EES: an economic perspective  
 
 
2.1. Origins and implementation of the EES 
 
The 1997’s Treaty of Amsterdam and Luxembourg Jobs Summit launched the EES. 
This strategy was originally built upon four “pillars” defined in the Employment 
Guidelines (EG): employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal opportunities. 
The Guidelines were to be designed by the Commission, approved by the European 
Council, and implemented by member states through the National Action Plans. 
Nowadays, employment policy is still a nation state matter but with a new important 
coordinated component at the European level.  
The Lisbon European Council in March 2000 set some strategic goals for the 
European Union, to increase its competitiveness and to achieve full employment. In 
fact, the Lisbon Summit linked the EES to the broader economic and social agenda of 
the EU. It also introduced some benchmarks for the employment rates, furthered later at 
the 2001 Stockholm Council1. 
In 2003, after the evaluation of the employment strategy in 2002 and the 
recommendations of the Employment Taskforce, there were three important changes 
affecting the EES. First, the original four pillars were developed and translated into ten 
titles (“result-oriented principles” or “commandments”) with their own benchmarks and 
recommendations. Second, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) and the EG 
were going to be jointly presented on a three-year basis, being the first one the 2003-05. 
Third and last, three overarching objectives were explicitly set: full employment; 
quality and productivity at work; social cohesion and inclusive labour markets. 
The Brussels Summit of March 2005 passed a modification of this procedure 
(Council of the EU, 2005; European Commission, 2005a). From now on (April 2005), 
the BEPG and the EG will be integrated in a three years-based document, the Integrated 
Guidelines (IG). On the basis of the IG, member states will draw up, on their own 
responsibility, their own National Reform Program. On its side, the Commission will 
present a Community Lisbon Programme, covering all action to be taken at EU level. 
The Commission would annually propose updates to the IG and possibly country-
specific recommendations. 
The changes introduced in the functioning of the EES seem to have produced an 
increase in the coherence of the strategy by deepening the links and synergies with the 
rest of the policies of the EU, and also by widening the temporal scope of the measures 
applied (three years formulation instead of one year). Anyway, the main problem is the 
kind of economic policies implemented by the EU, their pro-market trend, and specially 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the role of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
                                                          
1
 The 2010 target for total employment rate is 70%; for female employment rate more than 60%; for older 
workers’ employment rate is 50%. The intermediate benchmarks for 2005 are 67% for total employment 
and 57% for women. Nowadays it seems apparent that these intermediate objectives are not going to be 
met: in the 3rd quarter of 2004, the overall employment rate for the Euro-zone was 63.5% and the women 
employment rate was 54.9% (Harôarson and Romans, 2005).  
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Both of them are out of reach of this process of coordination and hamper the process of 
employment creation. 
 
2.2. The EES: how to create employment in the EU 
 
Employment creation is nowadays an important aim for the EU. Two EU recent 
documents connected with the EES can be highlighted. The first one is the Wim Kok’s 
Employment Taskforce Report (Kok, 2003). From its point of view the best way to 
create employment is to increase adaptability of workers and enterprises; to attract more 
people to the labour market; to invest in human capital; to ensure effective 
implementation of reforms. These ideas are in fact fully developed in the EES and can 
be partly traced back in previous documents of the EU like the Delors 1993 White Book 
or the conclusions of the 1994 Essen Summit.   
The second paper is still more important: the Commission Document on the 
Lisbon Strategy Renewal (European Commission, 2005b). The document identifies ten 
cornerstone actions to enhance European economic performance. Three of them are 
very linked to employment policy: to attract more people into employment and 
modernise social protection systems; to improve the adaptability of workers and 
enterprises and the flexibility of the labour market; and to increase investment in human 
capital through better education and skills2. These notions are developed in the EES too 
and were picked up in the March 2005 European Council, in the conclusions 29 to 35 
(Council of the EU, 2005).  
A first analysis of the content of the current EES shows that the subordination of 
this strategy to the BEPG was already specified in the Amsterdam Treaty. In fact, the 
EES was born and is still working in a “permanent state of tension” between 
“economic” and “social” agents. The EES follows a clear pro-market trend (it is 
inspired by the pro-liberal BEPG) but allows some important social measures and 
objectives to be found in the guidelines (e.g. improving provisions for childcare, 
enhancing working conditions or securing a better integration of immigrant workers).  
A supply-side approach can be clearly checked by analysing the most important 
objectives and measures contained in the guidelines. When examining the ten guidelines 
that have been adopted (Council of the EU, 2003) it is noticeable that the vast majority 
of policies are related to the supply side of the labour market (i.e. counselling; training 
and lifelong learning; increase of labour supply and promotion of active ageing; 
enhancing work attractiveness; augment flexible contract types to increase adaptability 
of the workforce). On the other hand, the demand side-orientated guidelines are limited 
in scope and affect mainly Small and Medium Enterprises by easing their financial, 
fiscal and administrative burdens and, affecting all kinds of firms, the design of new 
forms of work organisation.  
 
                                                          
2
 The others are: to extend and deepen the internal market; to ensure open and competitive markets inside 
and outside; to improve European and national regulation; to expand and improve European 
infrastructure; to increase and improve investment in R+D; to facilitate innovation, the uptake of ICT and 
the sustainable use of resources; and to contribute to a strong European industrial base. 
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2.3. EES and macroeconomic policies of the EU: a misplaced relationship3 
 
There are other policies that indirectly influence the evolution of the labour market and, 
to be more precise, the ability to create employment. One of them is macroeconomic 
policies, which are based on three different elements: the BEPG, the fiscal policy and 
the monetary policy.  
1. An important characteristic of the BEPG is their deep pro-market bias (it is based 
on ideas like liberalisation, deregulation or privatisation). They are also rooted in 
the idea of “sound macroeconomic policies” (budget deficit and inflation control). 
2. Fiscal policy at the EU level is based mainly on the SGP. The economic evolution 
of the EU has been hampered by the restrictive component of the pact, especially 
in situations of economic downturn. The SGP is actually being revised after its 
virtual collapse due to the German and French situation of permanent excessive 
deficit and the July 2004’s Court of Justice ruling. The European Council has just 
endorsed a modest reform of the Pact (Council of the EU, 2005). The reform 
softens one element of the SGP (excessive deficit procedure) while strengthening 
another (the deficit control in situations of economic prosperity). A second 
element of the EU fiscal policy is the European budget. This budget cannot play 
any important role because of its tiny size (approximately 1% of the EU GDP). 
So, it can act neither as a stabiliser in periods of economic crises nor as a tool for 
the development of the poorest zones of the EU. This problem is increasingly 
important due to the recent enlargement of the EU. 
3. Monetary policy at the EMU is implemented by the ECB. The policy has been 
more restrictive than the American Federal Reserve’s policy during the downturn 
period originating in late 2000 – early 2001. 
 
Summarising, the macroeconomic policies of the EU have had a restrictive bias in 
a situation of economic downturn. Hence, they have not been employment-friendly. 
Some very important changes in the SGP, the EU budget, the BEGP and the role and 
objectives of the ECB are needed to avoid this obstacle. 
 
2.4. EES and welfare state models 
 
The EES tries to introduce some degree of common employment policy while 
preserving the autonomy of each member state to implement a specific policy. 
The first thing to study is the impact of the EES on the different welfare state 
systems. Considering Esping-Andersen’s (1990) and Ferrera’s (1996) works and also 
the contribution of Begg et al.(2001) four models can be depicted in their traditional 
configuration:  
1. Liberal or Anglo-Saxon (UK, Ireland): market efficiency leading the role of the 
welfare state; low levels of social expenditure; high importance of means-tested 
                                                          
3
  This part is based on Ballester, Busquets and Guillén (2004). 
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schemes; it shows high levels of income disparities; labour market regulation is 
designed to ensure equitable contracts between employers and employees. 
2. Social-Democratic or Scandinavian (Denmark, Finland and Sweden): high levels 
of social expenditure; high importance of universalistic schemes; it shows low 
levels of income disparities; the regime is dedicated to securing individual social 
security through regulated labour markets. 
3. Corporatist or Continental (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands):  
average levels of social expenditure; high importance of occupational schemes; it 
shows average levels of income disparities; the model is devoted to maintaining 
and increasing living standards without altering the social order. 
4. Southern or Mediterranean (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain): low levels of 
social expenditure; high importance of occupational schemes; it shows high levels 
of income disparities; above average importance of family as income stabiliser; 
labour market regulations devoted to protecting the male breadwinner. 
 
The influence of the EES on the member states seems to be quite strong on 
Continental and Mediterranean models. In the first case, countries are moving from a 
passive to an active model and from a family-based to an individual entitlement system. 
In the second, the starting point (low employment rates, low female participation) is 
quite the opposite of what is “normal” in the EU. The impact on the liberal model seems 
to be marginal (the main problem is quality of work). Finally, the Scandinavian model 
is very adequate, so the impact is going to be negligible there (de la Porte and Pochet, 
2002).  
A second element to think about is the virtual non-existence of EU funds for 
labour market policies. This is quite problematical for Southern, and especially Central 
and Eastern European countries, with lower levels of income and high levels of 
unemployment, who are obliged by the SGP and the BEPG to control public 
expenditure. All this can turn into a contradiction, since real measures for labour market 
integration require an increase in public expenditure (Serrano Pascual, 2004).   
 
 
3. Definition and origins of activation 
 
 
3.1. Definition of activation 
 
Activation has become one of the most important concepts used in contemporary 
politics. There is broad consensus across wide ideological borders in the political class 
to support activation policies. It can be an appealing concept to both Social-Democrats 
and Christian-Democrats (it is useful to integrate excluded people, to offer opportunities 
for participation, or to maintain the viability of the welfare state) and to liberals (it can 
be used to fight against dependency and parasitism). (Hvinden, 1999; Van Berkel and 
Hornemann Møller, 2002; Serrrano Pascual, 2004) 
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Activation basically means the process of moving from a passive situation to an 
active one and is related to a broad range of policies (aims and instruments) directed at 
people receiving public benefits and/or being excluded from the labour market. It is 
characterised by a mix of incentives and disincentives, and it is based on the assumption 
that citizens behave rationally, reacting appropriately to external stimuli and always 
trying to maximise income.  
When analysing the European Employment Strategy, we can use activation and 
active labour market policies (ALMP) as synonyms (Hvinden, 1999). ALMP first 
appeared in Nordic countries after the Second World War and included measures such 
as job brokerage, job subsidies and training measures. The objective was to stimulate 
the supply of or the demand for labour as well as to enhance the match between them. 
These active policies are opposed to passive labour market policies which ensure some 
income to people in situations of unemployment4 (Fina, 2001). However, active and 
passive policies are not totally antithetical. On the one hand, passive policies include 
people in the “fields of consumption” and represent an indirect way to increase 
participation in society. On the other hand, active policies, when successful, increase 
clients’ resources (Van Berkel and Hornemann Møller, 2002). 
Activation is connected with two important notions: workfare and to make work 
pay. The first concept was created in the United States of America during the 70s. 
Workfare means the introduction of work requirements for people claiming public 
income support. To be more precise, it implies that claimants could have their benefits 
reduced or even withdrawn if they do not participate in some kind of work or training 
program. In this context, activation requires a process of control and categorisation 
implying that all unemployed people “able to work” should be required to do so and that 
only people actively looking for a job deserve social benefits (Darmon, 2004; Serrano 
Pascual 2001, 2004). In other words, the essence of workfare can be summarised in two 
imperatives: the State should place those on the margins of the labour force in jobs, or 
induce them to find jobs; the unemployed should be obliged to take and remain in such 
job. Thus, workfare can be thought as the “punitive” and “paternalistic” part of 
activation (Standing, 1999). Another important idea to highlight is that workfare 
represents a way of thinking that has figured strongly for hundreds of years. The 1834 
British Poor Law Amendment was a targeted system designed to reach only the 
deserving poor. We can also find traces of this debate on David Ricardo’s work.  
To make work pay means that governments have to ensure that working is always 
a more interesting option than receiving social benefits. To be more precise, from this 
point of view, taxes and social benefits distort the market allocation of resources, 
creating then unemployment. Two important phenomena can be found here: the 
unemployment trap, appearing when unemployment benefits are so high related to the 
potential wage that discourage unemployed people to re-enter into the labour market; 
                                                          
4
 This paper uses the classification of active and passive instruments designed by the OECD (OECD, 
Employment Outlook). It divides active instruments into five different categories: public employment 
services and administration; labour market training; youth measures; subsidised employment; measures 
for the disabled. There are two types of passive instruments: unemployment compensation and early 
retirement schemes.  
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the poverty trap, arising when the increase of income coming for the new job means the 
withdraw of social benefits and higher tax payments, meaning a fall in the real income 
(Employment Outlook, 1996). Hence, ALMP ought to consider the notion of make 
work pay to become really effective. It is nonsense to activate people if they do not have 
financial incentives to work (Kok, 2003).  
 
3.2. Activation and unemployment 
 
The use of activation to combat unemployment has been justified using very distinct 
arguments (Boone and Van Ours, 2004; Fina, 2001; Geldof, 1999; Heikkilä, 1999; 
Lødemel and Trickey, 2000; Serrrano Pascual, 2001 and 2004). A snapshot of the most 
important are: 
1. To fight against “dependency”. This is based on an idea deeply rooted in 
conservative ideology: social benefits are excessively generous and therefore 
directly discourage people from actively looking for a job (another dangerous 
influence comes from taxes on jobs.) In other words, moving from welfare 
protection to work does not mean any significant increase in income. Passive 
policies, more than being a solution to the unemployment problem, are causing it. 
Active policies, on the contrary, change the expectations of individuals, making 
passive benefits less attractive. This approach is the closest to the make work pay 
concept. This explanation assumes two hypotheses: there are enough vacancies 
and these vacancies are available for every unemployed person (Recio and 
Banyuls, 2004). A more comprehensive approach can be found in Peters’ analysis 
of the benefits system interaction with ALMP (Peters et al., 2004). It remarks that 
transition from unemployment to work does not only depend on benefits and 
ALMP. There are other elements like the labour market situation, the existing care 
support facilities or even cultural factors. 
2. To increase the competitiveness of the national economy. The rationale here is to 
subordinate social policy to the economic demand for higher flexibility in the 
labour market, and to improve the education and training of the workforce while 
lowering public expenditure.   
First, there is a profound need to meet the changing conditions in the world of 
production (increase in the importance of services, decline of the Fordist system 
of production, rise in the importance of knowledge as a factor of production). We 
are living in a world of risk and instability, and people have to adapt to changing 
situations, to successfully manage several job transitions. The best way to do that 
is through a constant process of activation. The welfare state now helps people to 
manage risk, not to avoid it. Unemployment becomes a problem of the individual; 
the state’s role is to provide individuals with tools to improve their personal 
capital. The problem now is not how to increase employment, but rather 
employability. 
Second, ALMP raises the efficiency of the economy. It invests in human capital 
(increasing then productivity) and maintains the size of the labour force by 
keeping up competition for available jobs. It also may eliminate mismatching in 
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the labour market and have a screening function by reducing uncertainty about 
employability of applicants.  
Third, passive policies can give money to the unemployed, but they cannot reduce 
unemployment levels. They were designed in the Fordist period, an era of high 
and stable employment levels. In situations of massive unemployment, traditional 
sources of financing the unemployment system (social contributions) tend to 
collapse. Hence, a move towards activation is justified. 
Fourth, increasing social expenditure (i.e. passive labour market policy) also leads 
to an increase in inflation and a reduction in the competitiveness of the national 
economy. Active policies, on the contrary, can reduce public expenditure by 
lowering unemployment levels. 
3. To assure the viability of the social model. The idea is to increase the participation 
rate in order to raise public income, decrease public expenditure, and contribute to 
the financial sustainability of the welfare state.   
4. To avoid social exclusion. From this perspective, unemployment is caused mainly 
by structural factors. A major pathway to poverty in Europe seems to be a 
persistent lack of work, especially among the less skilled workers. Hence, 
intervention in the labour market is needed for redistributive reasons.  
 
3.3. Is activation a panacea for employment creation? 
 
ALMP have some serious limitations in tackling unemployment (Begg et al., 2001; 
Fina, 2001; Lødemel, 2000; Peck and Theodore, 2000; Serrrano Pascual, 2001; Van 
Berkel and Roche, 2002):  
1. ALMP are necessary but they can only solve “limited” problems and have to be 
complemented by other policies. ALMP can improve conditions in the labour 
market, but would only operate correctly in an expansionary macroeconomic 
context. 
2. ALMP can resolve situations of structural and frictional unemployment (it can 
solve problems of permanent or temporary mismatching). In circumstances of 
cyclical unemployment, only those ALMP instruments aimed at increasing the 
creation of employment (demand-side approach) can be really useful. But some 
difficulties arise when trying to implement this kind of measure (for example, a 
subsidy paid to a firm to hire a person receiving unemployment benefits): 
a. The deadweight loss effect. Some people who are finally hired by 
enterprises would have probably found employment without the 
measure. There is a problem of selective recruitment, of creaming off. 
b. The substitution effect. Some existing employees might be replaced by 
unemployed people, resulting in no net employment creation.  
c. The displacing effect. Subsidies might be creating employment in one 
firm but reducing it in another, through an increase in the 
competitiveness of the first one caused by the subsidy and the new hiring 
(which distorts competition).  
 10 
3. It is very important to look at the type of work or option being offered to the 
unemployed. Proposing a secondary labour market option (non-standard forms of 
employment) is not the same as proposing a stable job. It is necessary to move 
beyond “first-job” approaches.  
4. The additional labour supply provided by ALMP can depress wages in the labour 
market, especially in low-income sectors. There is a risk of creating a poverty 
trap. 
5. A cost-benefit analysis of activation measures is not necessarily favourable. There 
are two main types of evaluation of ALMP. The micro studies the impact of 
program participation on individuals’ employment and earnings, whilst the macro 
estimates the net effect on aggregate employment and unemployment. One 
important thing to underline is that activation instruments vary in the degree to 
which they are successful or effective. There seems to be a consensus for training 
and public employment services as the best tools, and for specific, intensive, well-
targeted and short in duration programs5. Second, there is a risk of involuntary 
exclusion. In temporary schemes, when the program is over, clients run the risk of 
being unemployed again. In permanent schemes, there is a risk of marginalisation 
(lack of income improvement and institutionalised stigmatisation). 
 
3.4. Activation in the EES 
 
The current form of the EES disseminates activation instruments into different titles, 
mainly numbers 1 (active and preventative measures), 4 (promote development of 
human capital and lifelong learning); 5 (increase labour supply and promote active 
ageing); and 8 (make work pay). It also has connections with titles 6 (gender equality); 
and 7 (combat discrimination)6. An analysis of the guidelines (Council of the EU, 2003) 
shows five main instruments related to activation: 
                                                          

Martin and Grubb (2001) summarise the most important findings from the evaluation literature about the 
effectiveness of active measures for OECD. They support instruments like counselling, job-search 
assistance, public training programs, employment subsidies and subsidies for business start-ups. Kluve 
and Schmidt (2002), when analysing several previous studies for European countries, conclude that 
training is the best option. They also point at the fact that there is a positive correlation between tax 
wedge, employment protection, union density and ALMP. Boone and van Ours (2004) update data and 
use unemployment and employment-population rates. They find that training has the desired effects both 
on unemployment and employment-population rates; public employment services only affect 
unemployment, while subsidised jobs do not seem to have any effect. Marx (2001), when analysing the 
existing literature on job subsidies, underlines its low profile too. However, the author recommends 
linking job subsidies to job counselling and training to improve results. The author also points out that the 
twin problems of information and bureaucracy diminish the effectiveness of job subsidies. 
6
 The proposal of the Integrated Guidelines (European Commission, 2005c) means a new configuration of 
the Employment Guidelines, with three blocks (attract and retain more people in employment and 
modernise social protection systems; improve adaptability of workers and enterprises and the flexibility 
of labour markets; increase investment in human capital through better education and skills) directly 
connected with the Lisbon Strategy Renewal and developed into eight guidelines. This package is going 
to be passed on June 2005 and implemented by member states on autumn 2005.  
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1. ensuring that all jobseekers benefit from an early identification of their needs and 
from services like advice guidance; 
2. modernising and strengthening labour market institutions, in particular 
employment services; 
3. implementing lifelong learning strategies, including the improvement of the 
quality and efficiency of training systems; 
4. promoting active ageing, notably by fostering working conditions conducive to 
job retention and eliminating incentives for early exit, especially by reforming the 
early retirement schemes; 
5. revising replacement rates and benefit durations, and ensuring effective benefit 
management, notably with respect to the link with effective job search. 
 
There are also some quantitative objectives: 
1. offering a new start before six months of unemployment in the case of young 
people and before twelve in the case of adults in the form of training, work 
practice or a job; 
2. by 2010, having 25% of the long-term unemployed participating actively in a form 
of training, retraining, work practice or other employability measure, with the aim 
of achieving the average of the three most advanced member states; 
3. by 2010, having at least 85% of 22-year-olds in the EU with upper secondary 
school completed; 
4. achieving an average level of participation in lifelong learning of at least 12.5% of 
the adult working-age population in the EU; 
5. increasing by five years, at the EU level, the effective average exit age from the 
labour market. 
 
Hence, from the dominant activation perspective, workers are the ones who have 
to update their skills and enhance their companies’ competitiveness; they are also the 
ones who should be encouraged to remain in the labour market for a longer period of 
time to sustain the constrained increase in government expenditure. On the other hand, 
the main task of governments is to facilitate the employability of the population. Some 
of the most important instruments are: promoting training of the workforce; increasing 
the incentives to remain in the labour market (i.e. by reducing pensions); and advising 
and counselling in job searches. Although title eight is devoted to make work pay 
measures, workfare elements can also be detected in this title, with guidelines like those 
of reviewing replacement rates and benefit duration or hardening existing link between 
benefit entitlement and active job search.  
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4. Labour market policies in Spain since 1975: the road to 
flexibilisation 
 
 
4.1. Reforming the Spanish labour market  
 
The pre-democratic labour system was characterised by the prohibition of trade unions; 
the setting of basic wages at a very low level; and the establishment of a quasi-tenured 
employment system (Muñoz de Bustillo, 2002; Segura, 2004). The Spanish labour 
market policy since 1975 has been based mainly on deregulation and flexibilisation, and 
also on a reduction of labour costs. Nowadays passive policies are not viewed 
positively, while activation has only been recently developed. Employment objectives 
have been subordinated to macroeconomic stability (González-Calvet, 2002).  
The transition process established the framework and basis for the labour market 
legislation. Several laws can be emphasised: the 1978 Constitution recognised basic 
social and labour rights; the 1980 Workers’ Statute organised the industrial model; the 
1980 Basic Law on Employment regulated employment policies; and the 1984 Organic 
Law on Union Freedom regulated trade union activity (González-Calvet, 2002). The 
2003 Law on Employment has replaced the former Basic Law on Employment.  
In 1984 the socialist government passed one of the most important reforms of the 
Spanish labour market when it introduced temporary contracts. It was considered that 
the Spanish labour market was too rigid and the introduction of the temporary contracts 
the easiest way to increase flexibility. This reform was implemented in a context of 
severe economic recession and of growing unemployment (20.6%), and was intended to 
foster the creation and flexibilisation of employment; young people and long-term 
unemployed were the main objectives of the reform. There were two important elements 
of the reform: a gap was created between the cost of dismissal of temporary and 
permanent contracts, and the scope of temporary contracts was increased. Hence, the 
number of temporary contracts soared (up to 30%), resulting in an increase in labour 
market precariousness; it also helped to control the evolution of wages. 
The 1988 general strike changed the trend temporarily. Trade unions were able to 
obtain some social achievements, like improved social benefits (González-Calvet, 2002; 
Laparra and García, 2003) but the signing of the Maastricht Treaty rearmed the liberal 
perspective of the socialist government by giving more room for stability and 
liberalisation. The 1992 and 1993 reforms of the unemployment benefits meant an 
important cut in the contributory scheme (prestación por desempleo). The main 
argument for these reforms was the rise in public expenditure devoted to unemployment 
benefits in the context of the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. The qualifying 
period was augmented; the replacement rate and the duration of the payment were cut 
down; unemployment benefits will have, from these moment, to pay the income tax. 
Until 1993 unemployment subsidy (subsidio por desempleo) was improved but it has 
also been curtailed ever since (Cantó and Toharia, 2003). These reforms introduced a to 
make work pay component.  
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In 1994, in a period of intense economic crisis and with the unemployment rate 
peaking at 24%, the PSOE cabinet implemented the second most important labour 
market reform. The analysis was based on the assumption that the Spanish labour 
market was facing two important problems: it was too rigid and labour costs were 
excessively high. The reform was based on five main pillars: new forms of contracts 
were introduced (low-cost or high-flexible); deregulation of labour market was 
deepened (by easing labour mobility and working hour flexibility); dismissals were 
made more flexible by reducing the possibilities for nullifying a contract and cheaper by 
reducing transaction wages; temporary work agencies (Empresas de Trabajo Temporal, 
ETT) were introduced; and collective negotiation role was augmented (Ferreiro 
Aparicio, 2003; González-Calvet, 2002; Laparra and García, 2003; Muñoz de Bustillo, 
2002; Segura, 2004).  
1997 was the year of the third major labour reform. It was implemented by the 
right-wing Partido Popular with the support of the chief trade unions and employers’ 
organisations. Unemployment and temporality rates were still very high (21.5% and 
33.6% respectively). With this reform, flexibility was pursued alongside security. The 
prominent element of this reform was the Agreement for Permanent Employment. The 
idea was to enhance the competitiveness of Spanish firms by improving the quality of 
the labour market by reducing both temporality and rotation, whilst promoting 
continuous training. The agreement was implemented through several measures: a 
decrease in the number of temporary contracts; changes in the role of the ETT; an 
augment in the reasons for objective dismissals; and last but not least, the introduction 
of a new permanent contract, with lower dismissal costs than the existing one, and with 
tax benefits. This last contract was a “prototype”, designed only to be applied to some 
groups (young, older and long-term unemployed) and to be revised four years later 
(Cachón and Palacio, 1999; Ferreiro Aparicio, 2003; González-Calvet, 2002; Laparra 
and García, 2003). The reform seems to have had some positive effects: as much as 
80% of net employment created after the reform has been permanent employment, 
reversing the previous trend (Martín, 2004). It is worth to note that this reform of the 
labour market was linked to the Tripartite Agreement on Continuous Training.  
The July’s 2001 reform is another cornerstone. The basic objectives of the reform 
were to promote stable and indefinite contracts; to limit the abuse in the use of 
temporary contracts; to promote female, part-time and groups with special difficulties’ 
employment. The reform increased flexibility by widening the applicability and scope 
of the new permanent contracts; by reducing dismissal costs for normal permanent 
contracts; and by flexibilising working times for part-time and discontinuous permanent 
workers. It also introduced a limited compensation for the sacking of temporary workers 
(Bertelsmann, 2005; González-Calvet, 2002; Laparra and García, 2003).  
In May 2002, the PP tried to impose a new reform via a Royal Decree. The main 
aim was to reduce the number of unemployed receiving unemployment benefit for 
lengthy periods. The most important characteristics were: the unemployed people were 
forced to sign a written commitment with the employment office; the definition of 
suitable job was altered; unemployment protection was reduced for discontinuous 
permanent contracts; and interim wages were to be abolished (Bertelsmann, 2005; 
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Laparra and García, 2003). The June 2002 general strike eventually modified the 
governmental plans. When Aznar’s government passed a law in the Spanish Parliament 
some of the original measures were rather modified. Both the written commitment and 
the definition of a suitable job were softened7.  
This last reform is an excellent example of what workfare means. The two 
abovementioned elements of the reform imply that unemployed people should have to 
face now stricter rules connected with their unemployment benefits. They will have 
from now on both to look actively for a job and to have a narrower set of options for 
accepting a proposed job.  Unemployment benefit is at risk if the unemployed person is 
not able or willing to accomplish these conditions. This reform also perfectly fits with 
the EES. To be more precise, title 8 (Make work pay) explicitly states (Council of the 
EU, 2003: 8): “… Member States will in particular review replacement rates and benefit 
duration; ensure effective benefit management, notably with respect to the link with 
effective job search …”     
 
4.2. Employment strategy in Spain 
 
Employment policy in Spain is “framed” by the 2003 Law on Employment. This law 
tries to adapt Spanish employment policies to the new institutional environment 
(European policies, devolution to autonomous communities) and to the present situation 
of the labour market (high level of unemployment and temporality, insufficient rate of 
employment)8. The most important objective is to achieve full employment by 
increasing the efficiency of the labour market. The Law basically defines the meaning 
of ALMP as the set of schemes and measures of orientation, training and employment 
devoted to improve the employability of unemployed persons. It emphasises the 
importance of its preventative role and lists the priority groups (young people, women, 
older workers, handicapped people and immigrants). The law pays special attention to 
the role developed by the public employment services (the National Employment 
System); this system is decentralised and coordinated, and it has to guarantee the 
implementation of both active and passive schemes. The law defines the coordination 
between the active and the passive employment programs too, emphasising the fact that 
                                                          
7
 In the definite version, unemployed people have to look actively for a job and to participate in measures 
to improve his/her employability. It this version, suitable job is defined as that one which coincides with 
the last activity carried by the applicant for at least 3 months. If the unemployed person is not able to find 
a suitable job, then he/she must accept another job, at the discretion of the employment service. 
Unemployed people should have to accept a job that would be less than 30 kilometres from their home or 
require a return journey of less than 2 hours; duration and working time of the contract will be taken into 
account (Bertelsmann, 2005). 
8
 The Spanish unemployment rate in the 3rd quarter of 2004 was 10.6%; the EU-15’s was 7.9% and the 
eurozone’s was 8.6%. The employment rate for Spain was 61.3%, whilst for the Euro-zone and the EU-15 
figures were 63.5% and 65.2% respectively. The share of employees with temporary contracts was 31.2% 
in Spain, 15.3% in the Euro-zone and 13.7% in the EU-15. The employment rate for women was 48.4% 
in Spain, 54.9% in the Euro-zone and 57.2% in the EU-15 (Harôarson and Romans, 2005). The 2004 
NAP marked as objectives for 2005 61.1% for the total employment rate; 48.5% for the women and 
41.7% for older workers. 
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people receiving subsidies have to participate in active measures, introducing then an 
important workfare element (BOE, 2003).       
The Declaration in Favour of the Social Dialogue (DPDS, 2004), signed by the 
Spanish government and the most representative trade unions and employer’s 
organisations is another significant document when analysing Spanish employment 
guiding principles. It is the framework for the negotiation of the next labour market 
reform. It depicts the basic axis of the public policies when trying to achieve the 
objectives marked in the Lisbon Summit (to promote growth and employment). The 
government has to redirect expenditure to consolidate the social welfare system, to back 
investment on human and physical capital and also to guarantee the transparency of the 
markets and economic freedom. To be more precise, the government has to focus 
investment on these fields: education and training; infrastructures; research, 
development and innovation; industrial and environmental policies. The Declaration 
also detects two chief problems of the Spanish labour market: low level of employment 
and high level of temporary contracts. Then, the two most important priorities are to 
increase the level of and to promote stability in employment. Others priority actions are: 
to improve the situation of women; to increase the efficiency of the employment 
services; to simplify procedures necessary to create firms; to increase investment in 
education, R&D and ICT.  
Employment policy in Spain goes then hand in hand with the most important 
ideas contained in the EES. For example, four typical notions of the EES can be found 
in the Spanish strategy: the idea of increasing the efficiency of the labour market as a 
way to solve the problem of unemployment; the importance given to activation and 
especially to the role of the public employment systems; the need to increase human 
capital formation; and the necessity of linking active and passive schemes. 
Two final considerations deserve to be introduced here. The first one is that from 
the inception of the EES, unemployment rate in Spain has been falling from 17.0% in 
1997 to 10.6% in the third quarter of 2004 and employment has rocketed from 13.2 
million to 17.1 respectively (EIE 2004 and Harôarson and Romans, 2005). When trying 
to link employment creation to the EES one important question has to be introduced 
here: which kind of employment has been created? The answer is a little bit 
disappointing: Recio and Banyuls (2004) show that the improvement in employment 
has been based on traditional and not modern sectors. Tourism, construction and social 
services like health or education had leaded the way. The Spanish productive system is 
still one characterised by low quality in employment and limited rise in productivity. 
The last reflection is about the way unemployment is measured. The 1897/2000 
Regulation of the European Commission changed the definition of unemployed. From 
now on, an unemployed person is someone who has registered into a public 
employment office and who is actively looking for a job (not only renewing 
administrative regulation). Obviously, this has reduced unemployment figures by 
throwing out people considered to be passive jobseekers (Garrido and Toharia, 2004).  
According to CCOO estimates, the gap between unemployed with the old and the new 
definition was about 350,000 people in the fourth quarter of 2004 (CCOO’s website). 
Moreover, the May 2005 change in the definition of economic activity has increased the 
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number of the employed population in 3/5 of the total rise for the 1st quarter of 2005 
whilst decreasing unemployment in 21,000 people (INE’s website).     
 
 
5. Activation in Spain 
 
 
5.1. Comparing the importance of ALMP: Spain vs. the EU 
 
The successive Spanish governments have focused their labour market efforts more on 
increasing flexibility than on activating unemployed people (Chozas, 2000; González-
Calvet, 2002).  
 
Country/year 1990-92 1993-95 1996-98 1999-2001 2002 99-01/90-92 99-01/93-95 
Denmark 1.45 1.91 1.71 1.69 n.a. 1.17 0.88 
Finland 1.39 1.66 1.54 1.06 1.01 0.76 0.64 
Sweden 2.08 3.01 2.12 1.51 1.40 0.73 0.50 
France  0.89 1.29 1.33 1.33 1.25 1.49 1.03 
Germany 1.37 1.45 1.31 1.24 1.18 0.91 0.85 
Netherlands 1.09 1.38 1.55 1.71 1.85 1.57 1.24 
Ireland 1.50 1.52 1.66 1.14 n.a. 0.76 0.75 
UK 0.61 0.57 0.41 0.36 0.36 0.58 0.63 
Italy 0.54 1.47 0.69 0.60 0.57 1.11 0.41 
Portugal 0.75 0.78 0.80 0.71 n.a. 0.95 0.91 
Spain 0.70 0.65 0.62 0.92 0.87 1.33 1.41 
mean 1.12 1.43 1.25 1.11 n.a. 0.99 0.78 
Coeff variation 0.42 0.47 0.43 0.39 0.61 0.93 0.83 
Spain to mean 0.38 0.54 0.51 0.17 0.13 0.45 0.32 
Scandinavian 1.64 2.19 1.79 1.42 n.a. 0.87 0.65 
Continental 1.12 1.37 1.40 1.43 1.43 1.28 1.04 
Anglo-Saxon 1.06 1.05 1.04 0.75 n.a. 0.71 0.72 
Southern 0.66 0.97 0.70 0.75 n.a. 1.12 0.77 
Notes: no data for Denmark in 1991 and 2001; for Finland and Germany in 1991; for Sweden in 1990; for 
Ireland in 1992 and 1998 to 2000; for UK in 1990 and 1992; for Italy in 1990, and also for PES since 
1999; for Portugal in 2001. Source: author’s analysis, based on OECD Employment Outlook, several 
years. 
Table 1: Evolution of ALMP expenditure (1990-2002, as % of GDP, selected countries 
and models of welfare state) 
 
Table 1 analyses the evolution of ALMP expenditure from 1990 to 2002, using 
triennial means. Two different moments are compared. In the penultimate column the 
ratio 1999-2001 to 1990-92 is calculated; hence, the evolution for the whole period can 
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be studied (there are no data for some countries in 2002) 9. In the last column, the ratio 
1999-2001 to 1993-95 is found. This can be used as a proxy to study the influence of 
the EES, provided that 1999-2001 is the first three years period with the EES taking 
place and 1993-95 is the last one without the EES. While there not seems to be any 
important convergence phenomenon in ALMP expenditure (the coefficient of variation 
has no significant movement) Spain is leading the increase in funds devoted to this kind 
of policies and coming closer to the average. Scandinavian (despite of falling figures) 
and Continental countries show the highest levels of expenditure, whereas Southern and 
Anglo-Saxon countries show the lowest one.  
To obtain a more accurate indicator of the importance of ALMP expenditure two 
extra factors need to be introduced: the unemployment rate and the total government 
expenditure. Given a specific level of expenditure in ALMP (in relative terms to GDP), 
the greater the unemployment rate and the greater the level of total expenditure, the 
lower the real effort in combating unemployment via ALMP. Hence, a new indicator 
(intensity) is presented:  
 
Intensity = (expenditure in ALMP/total expenditure)  
* (1/unemployment rate) * 100 
 
Country/year 1990-92 1993-95 1996-98 1999-2001 2002 99-01/90-92 99-01/93-95 
Denmark 31.88 38.93 53.07 67.02 n.a. 2.10 1.72 
Finland 34.42 16.22 21.29 21.81 22.15 0.63 1.34 
Sweden 85.15 46.94 39.25 45.18 49.09 0.53 0.96 
France  18.63 20.24 20.85 26.43 26.91 1.42 1.31 
Germany 57.14 37.04 28.88 32.58 29.55 0.57 0.88 
Netherlands 35.50 39.47 65.45 132.16 138.22 3.72 3.35 
Ireland 23.28 24.89 46.00 74.42 n.a. 3.20 2.99 
UK 16.47 13.55 14.16 16.67 16.89 1.01 1.23 
Italy 11.21 24.47 11.57 12.04 13.19 1.07 0.49 
Portugal 38.08 25.43 27.59 36.81 n.a. 0.97 1.45 
Spain 11.34 7.26 8.69 19.99 19.13 1.76 2.75 
mean 33.01 26.77 30.62 44.10 n.a. 1.34 1.65 
Coeff. variation 0.67 0.46 0.60 0.80 1.05 1.20 1.73 
Spain to mean 0.66 0.73 0.72 0.55 0.51 0.83 0.75 
Scandinavian 50.48 34.03 37.87 44.67 n.a. 0.88 1.31 
Continental 37.09 32.25 38.39 63.73 64.89 1.72 1.98 
Anglo-Saxon 19.88 19.22 30.08 45.55 n.a. 2.29 2.37 
Southern 20.21 19.05 15.95 22.94 n.a. 1.14 1.20 
Source: author’s analysis, based on OECD Economic Outlook and OECD Employment Outlook 
Table 2: Evolution of intensity on ALMP expenditure (1990-2002, selected countries 
and models of welfare state) 
                                                          
9
 Denmark, Finland and Sweden for the Scandinavian model; France, Germany and the Netherlands for 
the continental; Ireland and the United Kingdom for the Anglo-Saxon model; Italy, Portugal and Spain 
for the Southern;  
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Several conclusions can be drawn from the information provided by Table 2. 
First, if we look at the coefficient of variation, there not seems to be any real 
convergence on ALMP (it has been increasing since 1993-95). Second, in spite of this, 
there is a strong tendency to increase the intensity of ALMP, especially since the 
inception of the EES, with the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark and Spain leading the 
way, and only 3 out of 11 countries decreasing ALMP. Third, Spain and the rest of 
Southern European countries show poor levels of ALMP expenditure, whereas 
Continental countries are leading the way. 
 
5.2. Comparing the type of ALMP:  Spain vs. the EU 
 
This section is devoted to study which are the most important ALMP schemes.  
 
Country/type Employment 
services 
Training Youth Subsidised 
employment 
Disabled 
Denmark (*) 7.6 54.4 6.3 10.8 21.5 
Finland 11.8 29.7 16.8 32.7 7.9 
Sweden  26.4 20.7 1.4 15.0 35.7 
France  14.4 18.4 32.0 28 7.2 
Germany  19.5 27.1 8.5 18.6 25.4 
Netherlands 15.1 32.4 2.2 17.8 31.9 
Ireland (+) 21.1 14 15.8 46.5 2.6 
UK  46 5.4 35.1 8.1 5.4 
Italy (=) n.a. 8.8 35.1 56.1 n.a. 
Portugal (*) 18.0 24.6 36.1 14.8 6.6 
Spain  10.3 25.3 6.9 51.7 3.4 
Mean 19.0 23.7 17.8 27.3 14.8 
Notes: (*) Year 2000;  (+) year 2001; (=) employment services and disabled people figures not available 
for Italy. Source: OECD Employment Outlook 
Table 3: Expenditure in active labour market policies by type (2002, otherwise 
indicated) 
 
As is it shown in Table 3, Spain, compared to other EU countries, concentrates 
funding on subsidised employment, whilst training is very close to the mean and youth 
and disable spending are undeveloped. The employment services category is still 
registering quite a low profile. This element is rather important, because OECD 
countries have two different trends when implementing active policies (García Serrano, 
2000): the first one, a move from direct employment creation to subsidising jobs in the 
private sector; the second one, the increase of funds for job search assistance and 
counselling, two of the most important functions of the employment services. Spain is 
still lacking this second kind of investment.  
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5.3. Active labour market programs in Spain 
 
ALMP in Spain can be grouped into three different main blocks: Public employment 
services, training schemes and subsidised employment (Alujas Ruiz, 2002; CES, 2005a 
Sáez, 2000):  
1. Employment services still play a poor role. They are related to Guideline 1 of the 
EES (active and preventative measures for the unemployed and inactive). This 
first component of the ALMP in Spain is divided into three different parts: 
1.1. Public employment services (PES), pivoting around the INEM (Instituto 
Nacional de Empleo, National Employment Institute). Autonomous 
Communities have their own employment offices (MTAS, 2003)10. The PES 
i.e. register unemployed people looking for a job; pre-select the most 
appropriate people for the existing vacancies; give information to firms and 
unemployed people about employment and training measures; design and 
follow-up the written commitment of the unemployed; and provide 
orientation to unemployed people through interviews, with special attention 
to problematical groups. In 2003, the PES registered only 15% of the 
contracts. In 2003, employability measures were carried out with 1,410,700 
unemployed people; 76% of these cases were of a preventative nature. 
There were 1,942,400 measures: 56.2% were guidance or advice; 22.3% 
training; 11.4% direct assistance for employment in the public sector work 
of social interest; and 3.6% a combination of training and employment 
(MTAS, NAP 2004). 
1.2. Non-profit employment agencies. Their objective is to help unemployed 
people to find a job and firms to hire people. They cannot obtain profits 
from their activities. They depend on local and regional governments and 
professional organisations.  
1.3. Empresas de Trabajo Temporal (ETT). In 2003, there were more than 300 
ETT in Spain, which “concluded” 1,815,000 contracts. 
 
2. Training schemes are structured upon several schemes devoted to some special 
groups (Alujas Ruiz, 2002). They are directly linked to the fourth employment 
guideline (promote the development of human capital and lifelong learning) 
(MTAS, NAP 2003). Three different schemes can be emphasised: 
                                                          
10
 Ever since 1994 there has been a process of devolution of the public employment services to the 
autonomous communities (regions). Regions can manage the national programs but also their own 
schemes. It is also worth to notice the implementation of the Regional Employment Pacts (REP), signed 
by the respective government, trade unions and employers’ organisations. The REP develops the specific 
schemes for employment and, in some cases, for economic development of the territory (they include 
measures connected with industrial or regional policy). Instruments included in the REP are in fact quite 
close to the Spanish employment strategy: promotion of permanent employment and of self-employment; 
investment in permanent training, especially in vocational training; improvement in the functioning of the 
public employment service. Some autonomous communities also include instruments like the promotion 
of the social economy or the use of the reduction of working time as a way to increase employment 
(Aragón and Rocha, 2003). 
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2.1. The most important one is based on the Programa Nacional de Formación 
Profesional (PNFP, National Vocational Training Program). Its main aims 
are to ensure a more skilled population, improve matching between the 
supply of and the demand for labour, and obtain greater coherence in the 
vocational training system (MTAS, 2003). This means increasing the 
coherence between three subsystems: vocational oriented secondary 
education, professional vocational training and lifelong training (Alujas 
Ruiz, 2002). 
The first element is part of the “normal” Spanish educational system. Free 
and compulsory schooling ends at 16 years of age. Vocational oriented 
secondary school (VOSS) is an alternative to the high school option oriented 
towards university studies (“bachillerato”). There are 142 occupational 
diplomas. In year 2003-04, there were 466,000 students in the VOSS and 
635,000 in the “bachillerato” 11 (MEC web site). Figures also show a mixed 
picture: on the one hand, there has been an important increase in the relative 
number of students but, on the other hand, there is no significant rise in the 
rate of people who has successfully completed at least higher secondary 
education (MTAS, NAP 2004).  
The second component is devoted to the insertion and re-insertion of 
unemployed people through re-training. Efforts are concentrated on 
problematical groups like the young, low-skilled or long-term unemployed. 
The programs offered are articulated with information provided by the 
public employment system.  
The third piece is lifelong learning. Spain has been traditionally 
characterised by an absence of training by firms. Nowadays, this subsystem 
is based on two agreements: the first one (Tripartito, National Foundation 
for Training in Employment) signed by the government, employers’ 
organisations and trade unions; the second one (3er Acuerdo Nacional para 
la Formación Contínua, ANFC, 3rd National Agreement for Lifelong 
Training), signed only by employers’ organisations and trade unions. People 
who have passed through the training programs have sharply increased from 
273,000 in 1993 to 1,627,500 in 2001, and formation plans have rocketed 
from 692 in 1993 to 7,796 in 2003 (CES, 2005a). Training by firms is 
promoted by reductions in social security contributions for companies which 
train their employees, providing special advantageous treatment for small- 
and medium-sized companies (MTAS, 2003; MTAS, NAP 2004).  
2.2. A secondary element of the training system in Spain is the Escuelas Taller y 
Casas de Oficios (Craft School-Workshops). It is a special scheme because 
students combine training and work, and hence learn a profession. 
Participants were 39,400 in 2003. The Talleres de Empleo, dedicated to the 
                                                          
 
The Programas de Garantía Social (Social Guarantee Programs) are programmes comprising measures 
aimed at young people in the 16-21 age group that have not achieved the minimum objectives of 
compulsory schooling. The measures are of three types: work-introduction schemes, combined 
training/work and vocational workshops. In 2003-04, there were 42,500 people in this program. 
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unemployed over 25 years of age with problems finding a job in the normal 
labour market registered 23,800 people in 2003 (ETCO’s site).  
 
3. Subsidised employment. This is the part of the ALMP in Spain most directly 
connected with guidelines 5 (increase labour supply and promote active ageing) 
and 8 (make work pay) and indirectly connected with Guidelines 6 (gender 
equality) and 7 (combat discrimination). 
3.1. Private employment. 
In 2004, there were 18 different types of subsided private contracts. They 
covered distinct issues, including problematic groups (i.e. the long term 
unemployed, women, the unemployed over 45 years of age as well as those 
over 55); social insertion (marginalised people, women who have been 
victims of domestic violence, disabled people); insertion of young people; 
transforming temporary contracts into indefinite contracts; promoting active 
ageing; and maternal leave. Subsidies range from 20% to 100% and usually 
cover from 12 to 24 months. In 2003, there were 630,600 indefinite 
subsided contracts: i.e. 380,000 conversion to indefinite contracts; 137,000 
women; 80,000 older workers (CES, 2005a). 
3.2. Support to entrepreneurship 
Several programs can be found here i.e. subsidies for self-employment and 
support for the creation of cooperatives and workers’ partnerships 
(Sociedades Anónimas Laborales, SAL). In 2003, for example, there were 
78,000 people receiving a preferential loan and 30,800 jobs in cooperatives 
were created with people capitalising their employment benefits (MTAS, 
NAP 2004).  
3.3. Public employment.  
This part of the ALMP in Spain is mainly based on the collaboration of the 
public employment services with, on the one hand, town councils and, on 
the other hand, the state, regional governments and universities. The idea is 
to create employment in areas of social interest. In 2002, there were 50,000 
contracts with town councils, 5,300 with the rest of the civil service, and 
also 100,000 of the agrarian sector in Andalusia and Extremadura (MTAS, 
2003)12. 
 
 
                                                          
12
 There is one interesting assessment of the Spanish ALMP: the 2004 Impact Evaluation of the EES in 
the Spanish Autonomous Communities (quoted in CES, 2005a). It points at the fact that participants in 
the programs take advantage from participation, but there are important differences coming from 
participants: long term unemployed and people receiving unemployment benefits seem to be really 
benefited from participation. Furthermore, the effectiveness of measures is limited by the tiny size of 
Spanish PES. When analysing continuous training, it underlines its positive role; the positive correlation 
between previous studies and success in finding employment; and the importance of the regional 
economic dynamic. When studying employment subsidies, the report remarks two things: first, they have 
contributed to lower the temporality rate; second, the low mortality rate (10%) of subsided permanent 
contracts.     
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5.4. Activation in Spain and the EES 
 
This relationship can first be analysed by looking at the NAPs presented by the Spanish 
government since 1998. This task is pretty difficult given the changes the EU has 
introduced in the EES guidelines and the content of the NAPs (the Spanish government 
has improved the information and details contained in these documents).   
The NAPs seem to reflect that the Spanish government has concentrated its efforts 
on a group of policies devoted to: 
a) Improving the functioning of the Public Employment Services, which has meant, 
since the 1998 Report: the decentralisation of this service (returning it to the 
regions); focusing on problematical groups; using a centralised system of 
information (the SYSPE program) and the personalisation of the service (through 
individual interviews and counselling). It is worth noting that the vast majority of 
these measures seem to have been adopted as a direct influence of EU guidelines.   
b) Improving the running of the vocational training system. Since 1998, several 
projects have been introduced: providing distinct services for people under 25 (for 
whom training is the most appropriate option) and for people over 25 (access to 
work and vocational training combined); the introduction of the Talleres de 
Empleo (Craft Workshop Schools); the creation of the National System of 
Qualifications and Vocational Training; the inception of the Renta activa de 
inserción (Active Job Seeker’s Benefit); and the extension of continuing training 
to new groups (self-employed and partners in co-operatives). One of the most 
important elements connected with training, the National Vocational Training 
Programme, has been implemented since 1996. But the same trend identified in 
the Public Employment Services seems to be true here: the Spanish government is 
adapting its policy to the European framework. 
c) Increasing the number and types of subsidies. This appears to be the least 
correlated element. The Spanish government has used some guidelines (i.e. 
reducing taxes on labour) to implement its particular policy in this field. The 
plethora of incentives being progressively introduced are more related to problems 
of the Spanish labour market (high level of temporality, low level of part-time 
jobs, existence of problematical groups – the long-term unemployed, youth, 
women) than to the implementation of the EES (the EU has only recently 
introduced temporality as a problem). 
 
A second factor to consider here is the recommendations addressed by the 
Commission to individual member states from 2000 to 2004. In spite of a potential 
spurious use of this tool (the Commission can keep a tight rein on some countries when 
trying to bargain something in a different field) it can still be a useful tool to assess the 
degree of compliance with the EES, as well as the problems detected by the 
Commission in the labour market. Spain, with 26 recommendations (13 related to 
activation) is situated in the upper part of the ranking, showing a relatively high level of 
problems related to active policies. The mean for the 11 countries studied are 20.7 and 
10.3 respectively. Southern countries show the worst results, whereas Anglo-Saxon and 
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Scandinavian countries are the best placed. For the Spanish case, the type of 
recommendations associated with activation have usually been focused on the efficiency 
of the public employment services, the need to improve vocational and continuing 
training (as a part of a strategy based on lifelong learning), and the necessity to reduce 
early school leaving. Since 2003 several new proposals have been introduced, reducing 
the high share of fixed-term contacts and increasing the participation and efficiency of 
active labour market measures devoted to disadvantaged people, especially young 
people, the long-term unemployed and disabled people. Consequently, there seems to be 
an unambiguous link between those elements listed as problematical by the EU and 
those considered as a priority by the Spanish government13.   
 
 
6. Passive policies in the Spanish labour market  
 
The Spanish unemployment benefit system has two elements: the unemployment 
insurance (prestación por desempleo) and the unemployment assistance (subsidio por 
desempleo). The first one is contributory based, whereas the second one is not. The 
Spanish model is an example of a professional model moving towards a universal one 
(Cantó and Toharia, 2003)14. The chief characteristics of the Spanish unemployment 
system are depicted in Table 4. 
To analyse the importance of the passive system, the gross replacement rates of 
unemployment benefits for the eleven countries of the study are used first. Spain is 
located in the middle part (replacement rate in the Spanish case is 31%, and the mean 
for the eleven countries is 35% in year 2002). When using net replacement rates, a 
slightly different pattern appears: the Spanish short-term unemployed face better 
conditions than the average whereas the long-term unemployed face worse conditions. 
For the first situation, Spanish figure is 78.5% while the average for the eleven 
countries is 75.2%. In the second case, the overall rates for people not receiving social 
assistance are 31% for the Spanish case and 55% for the mean of the eleven countries; 
when receiving social assistance figures are 51% and 65% respectively.  Thus, the 
Spanish passive system cannot be blamed for being very generous15.   
                                                          
13
 A more detailed analysis of the recommendations can be found in Ballester (2004). 
14
 The professional or German model is contributory based (focused then on workers) and it is based on 
the idea of income substitution. It does not intend to redistribute income between different groups. The 
universal or Anglo-Saxon model tries to redistribute income and is also set to guarantee some level of 
income to the entire population. It is financed both by contributions and by taxes. This model has also 
been partially adopted by Scandinavian countries. In fact, the vast majority of existing models are a mix 
of these two pure ones (Cantó and Toharia, 2003).   
15
 The net replacement rate for short-time unemployed is defined as the non-weighted mean for people 
earning 67% of APW and 100% of APW. Author’s analysis based on OECD, Benefits and wages 2004. 
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Concepts Characteristics of the Spanish system 
Basic principles o UI and UA: Compulsory social insurance scheme 
Field of application o UI: Employed workers included in Social Security system  
o UA: Workers exhausted entitlement UI + Workers no entitlement UI + others 
Conditions 
(activation) 
o UI: Be capable to work and look actively a job + endorse a compromise of activity + be at 
disposal of employment office (accept job and participate in training programs) 
o UA: To have not refused a job proposal either a training program 
Minimum qualifying 
period (for UI) 
o 360 days during last 6 years 
Benefits (determining 
factors) 
o UI: related to contributions paid (depending on earnings and number of contribution 
years) 
Benefits (reference 
earnings and ceiling)  
o UI: Employees’ contribution during last 180 days immediately preceding unemployment. 
Maximum level of contributions.  
o UA: 75% of the minimum wage 
Benefits (rates and 
ceiling)  
 
 
 
 
o UI: 70% of earnings for the first 180 days; 60% afterwards. Minimum: 75% of minimum 
wage if no dependant children; 100% if dependant children (from July 2004, 80% or 
107% respectively of the Public Indicator of Multiple Effects Income –IPREM-). 
Maximum: 170% to 220% of minimum wage according to number of dependant children 
(from July 2004, 175% to 225% of the IPREM) . 
o UA: 75% of the minimum wage (from July 2004, 80% of the IPREM). Special condition 
for people over 45. 
Benefits (duration) 
 
o UI: Depending on contribution period over preceding 6 years. Between 4 months (12 to 
18 months of contribution) and 2 years (more than 72 months of contribution). 
o UA: Normal: 6 months, with 2 possible extensions of 6 months periods. Special condition 
for workers over 45. In case of workers over 52, is possible extension to age of retirement  
Benefits 
(capitalisation for UI) 
o It can be capitalised to participate in cooperatives, workers’ partnerships or for self-
employment  
Early retirement 
system 
o Partial retirement from age 60 (with proportional reduction of benefit) + workers (aged 
55) in restructuring sectors. Workers must meet all conditions except age criterion 
Note: UI: Unemployment insurance (prestación por desempleo); UA: unemployment assistance (subsidio de 
desempleo). Source: INEM’s site and MISSOC (2004)  
Table 4:  The Spanish unemployment system (situation on 1st January 2004, otherwise 
indicated) 
 
The importance of the Spanish unemployment benefit system can be also assessed 
using the intensity indicator. When looking at the Spanish figures, one important caveat 
has to be introduced: social policies in Spain are undeveloped. In 2001 the importance 
of social protection (ratio social protection expenditure to GDP) was 27.3% for the EU-
15 and only 20.1% for Spain (in fact, this gap has risen since 1980). In per head terms, 
figures were respectively 6,405 and 3,253 euros. This fact can partly explain why 
unemployment benefits seem to be so important in Spain when using the indicator 
unemployment benefits expenditure to total social expenditure; the Spanish figure in 
2001 was 12.9% and the EU-15 was 6.2%. The problem is focused on the extreme low 
level of expenditure on fields like family and children (8.0% for the EU-15 and only 
2.6% for Spain) and housing and social exclusion (3.6% and 1.7% respectively) 
(European Commission, 2004). Another important characteristic of the Spanish welfare 
system is that is mainly financed through employers’ social contributions: in 2002, 
53.9% of social protection expenditure in Spain was financed by social contributions 
payments by employers while the figure was only 38.9% for the EU-15; on the other 
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hand, taxes were financing the 36.8% of social expenditure in the EU-15 but only 
27.1% in Spain (CES 2005b) 
The other important factor explaining the importance of unemployment subisidies 
in Spain is the different levels of unemployment rate, 10.6% and 7.4% respectively 
(European Commission, EIE 2004).  
 
Country/year 1990-92 1993-95 1996-98 1999-2001 2002 99-01/90-92 99-01/93-95 
Denmark 103.08 103.44 118.06 123.10 n.a. 1.19 1.19 
Finland 62.65 44.66 42.81 44.59 45.18 0.71 1.00 
Sweden 51.91 41.58 38.88 40.58 36.82 0.78 0.98 
France  40.46 30.57 28.30 33.34 38.96 0.82 1.09 
Germany 64.25 63.55 53.57 52.90 53.34 0.82 0.83 
Netherlands 78.59 89.12 134.98 143.47 128.51 1.83 1.61 
Ireland 48.43 46.40 67.07 45.70 n.a. 0.94 0.98 
UK 25.65 37.45 34.82 25.40 18.76 0.99 0.68 
Italy 18.91 17.52 13.92 12.70 14.58 0.67 0.73 
Portugal 25.72 31.84 29.10 44.33 n.a. 1.72 1.39 
Spain 45.81 32.18 25.19 29.29 34.08 0.64 0.91 
mean 51.41 48.94 53.33 54.13 n.a. 1.05 1.11 
Coeff. variation 0.49 0.54 0.73 0.76 0.77 1.56 1.41 
Spain to mean 0.11 0.34 0.53 0.46 0.26 4.21 1.34 
Scandinavian 72.55 63.23 66.58 69.42 n.a. 0.96 1.10 
Continental 61.10 61.08 72.28 76.57 73.60 1.25 1.25 
Anglo-Saxon 37.04 41.92 50.94 35.55 n.a. 0.96 0.85 
Southern 30.15 27.18 22.73 28.77 n.a. 0.95 1.06 
Notes: No data available for Denmark years 1991 and 2001; Finland and Germany. 1991; Sweden. 1990; 
Ireland 1992 and 1997 to 2000; UK. 1990 and 1992; Portugal. 2001.  Source: author’s analysis. based on 
OECD Economic Outlook and OECD Employment Outlook. 
Table 5: Evolution of intensity on passive expenditure (1990-2002. selected countries) 
 
Table 5 illustrates that there is no process of convergence in the use of passive 
policies; the coefficient of variation has been increasing since 1990-92. On the one hand 
the ratio for the 11 selected countries has moved from 51.41 in 1990-92 and 48.94 in 
1993-95 to 54.13 in 1999-2001. On the other hand only 4 out of 11 countries have 
increased their relative effort on passive policies during the period 1993-95 to 1999-
2001. Spain shows a noticeable trend towards a decrease in the use of passive policies. 
Continental and Scandinavian countries have the highest levels whereas Southern show 
the lowest ones.  
The last step of the empirical analysis is to compare the evolution of passive and 
active policies. The ratio active to passive expenditure is used to measure this evolution 
(Table 6). 
There seems to emerge a process of convergence (in relative terms) towards 
activation. First, the coefficient of variation has decreased from 0.62 in 1990-92 to 0.37 
in 1999-2001. Second, the ratio for the 11 selected countries has moved from 0.70 in 
1990-92 and 0.63 in 1993-95 to 0.84 in 1999-2001. Additionally, 9 out of 11 countries 
have increased their relative effort on active policies since the inception of the EES. 
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Spain shows a very impressive record converging to the mean. Only the Netherlands 
has surpassed Spain, but the difference is extremely tiny if we compare the 1999-2001’ 
situation with the 1993-95’ one. In comparative terms, there no seems to be significant 
differences between models, but Anglo-Saxon and Southern countries are on the top 
(mainly because of the low level of passive expenditure).  
 
 
Country/year 1990-92 1993-95 1996-98 1999-2001 2002 99-01/90-92 99-01/93-95 
Denmark 0.31 0.38 0.45 0.54 n.a. 1.76 1.45 
Finland  0.55 0.36 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.89 1.35 
Sweden  1.64 1.13 1.01 1.11 1.33 0.68 0.99 
France  0.46 0.66 0.74 0.79 0.69 1.72 1.20 
Germany  0.89 0.58 0.54 0.62 0.55 0.69 1.06 
Netherlands  0.45 0.44 0.48 0.92 1.08 2.04 2.08 
Ireland  0.48 0.54 0.69 1.63 n.a. 3.39 3.04 
UK  0.64 0.36 0.41 0.66 0.90 1.02 1.81 
Italy  0.59 1.40 0.83 0.95 0.90 1.60 0.68 
Portugal  1.48 0.80 0.95 0.83 n.a. 0.56 1.04 
Spain  0.25 0.23 0.35 0.68 0.56 2.76 3.03 
mean 0.70 0.63 0.63 0.84 n.a. 1.19 1.34 
Coeff. variation 0.65 0.57 0.36 0.38 n.a. 0.59 0.67 
Spain to mean 0.65 0.64 0.45 0.19 n.a. 0.29 0.29 
Scandinavian 0.83 0.62 0.65 0.72 n.a. 0.86 1.15 
Continental 0.60 0.56 0.59 0.78 0.77 1.29 1.38 
Anglo-Saxon 0.56 0.45 0.55 1.14 n.a. 2.04 2.54 
Southern 0.77 0.81 0.71 0.82 n.a. 1.06 1.02 
Source: author’s analysis. based on OECD Economic Outlook and OECD Employment Outlook 
Table 6: Evolution of the relative importance of passive labour market policies 
expenditure (active expenditure to passive expenditure, 1990-2002, selected countries) 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
 
The paper has summarised some important notions connecting activation and the EES. 
The first one asserts that activation is a “fuzzy” concept with distinct origins and 
objectives but with wide political consensus. In this paper the labour-market definition 
of activation has been adopted, given that it is very close to the EES orientation. 
Activation means the process of passing from a passive to an active situation in the 
labour market. It has important connections with concepts like workfare or to make 
work pay. 
The second one states that activation can be a useful tool to manage 
unemployment but it is not a panacea. It has to be combined with others policies (like 
macroeconomic) in order to achieve positive results, because unemployment is not only 
connected with the labour market itself. Activation has to be based on well-funded. high 
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quality and focused schemes. First job approaches closest to workfare must be avoided 
provided they could decrease human capital accumulation.  
Finally the configuration of the EES has evolved since its creation in 1997. 
Employment policy in the European Union is based on ideas contained in the renewed 
Lisbon Strategy like attracting more people into employment, improving the 
adaptability of workers (and firms), and increasing investment in human capital. It is 
characterised by a supply-side approach and by its subordination to the pro-liberal 
BEPG. Activation is one of its most important aims and instruments and it is concreted 
on several quantitative objectives. It is developed in several EES’ guidelines (mainly 
first. fourth. fifth and eighth). The EES appears to have had distinct effects on the 
different welfare state models and its efficiency is hampered by the subordination to the 
macroeconomic policies of the EU.  
The paper has also recorded the fact that from the mid-70s to the mid-90s Spain 
suffered one of the poorest records in the European labour market. Increases in 
unemployment and temporality were the two most important elements of this negative 
evolution. Labour market policies were (and still are) oriented towards an increase in 
flexibility, deregulation and control of labour costs.  
The empirical part of the paper, when analysing the evolution of active and 
passive policies at the EU level, has used a sample of 11 EU member countries 
representing the four welfare states models. It shows that there has been an important 
quantitative increase in the use of activation measures since the inception of the EES, 
whilst the evolution of the importance of passive policies has not been so clear. 
The paper also demonstrates that activation has only recently been introduced as a 
tool to combat unemployment in the Spanish labour market. Although it has been 
increasing at a very fast pace it is not yet important as it is in other EU countries. It is 
clearly subsidised employment oriented and with low levels of guidance and assistance 
(the public employment system is undeveloped). Activation policies in Spain seem to be 
following the EES and the EU recommendations. Passive policies have been 
progressively curtailed in Spain since mid-80s, whereas workfare and to make work pay 
measures have been expanded. Spain shows one of the most impressive records in the 
relative evolution of active to passive measures since the inception of the EES.  
 Further research has to be carried out in the Spanish labour market. The two most 
important points are: studying the discourse of politicians and theorists concerning the 
labour market and how those ideas have been implemented (and their relationship with 
the EES); analysing the influence of labour market policies on this market (have the 
reforms really transformed it?; what has been its quantitative and qualitative impact?).    
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